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Abstract: This study assesses the efficacy of Ireland’s recently introduced risk equalisation scheme in
its voluntary health insurance market. Robust risk equalisation is especially important in an Irish context
given acute risk segmentation and incentives for risk selection that have evolved within the market.
Using uniquely acquired VHI data (N=1,235,922) this analysis assesses the predictive efficacy of both
current and alternative risk equalisation specifications. Results suggest that the low predictive power of
the current risk equalisation design (R2 = 6.8 per cent) is not appropriately correcting for anti-competitive
incentives and asymmetries in the market. Improvements to the current design could be achieved through
the introduction of diagnosis-based risk adjusters.
I INTRODUCTION
Community rating, which limits the extent insurers can vary premiums basedon insurees’ risk profiles, is a key feature of many health insurance markets.
While promoting equity, this regulation incentivises insurers to focus on attracting
low-risk (profitable) consumers while avoiding high-risk (unprofitable) consumers,
a phenomenon known as risk selection. Risk selection has a number of negative
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consequences; potentially resulting in market segmentation, poor quality service to
high-risks (e.g. old and sick), and/or a welfare loss as investment is focussed on
attracting low-risks (e.g. young and healthy) rather than price and quality
competition (van de Ven, 2011; van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). The best strategy for
reducing risk selection incentives has been identified as good risk adjustment (van
de Ven and Ellis, 2000). Commonly, this involves providing risk-adjusted premia
subsidies to insurers based on insurees’ risk profiles, thereby equalising the risks
different insurees represent. These subsidies are then generally administered through
what is known as a risk equalisation (RE) scheme (van de Ven, 2011). 
Risk equalisation is a common feature of many community-rated competitive
health insurance markets internationally (see, Breyer et al., 2012). However, the
Irish market evolved largely without the allocation of risk-adjusted subsidies
between insurers. This raised important policy concerns as it created strong
incentives for risk selection and contributed to acute market segmentation which
has undermined community rating regulations (Turner and Shinnick, 2013;
Armstrong, 2010).
Risk equalisation payments have been in operation since 2013, yet lack of
access to individual-level claims data has made analysis of the efficacy of the
current risk equalisation design difficult. Recently, Keegan et al. showed that the
current Irish RE design substantially reduced cost differentials between switchers
and stayers, although perhaps not completely eliminating them (Keegan et al.,
2015). Yet a more detailed statistical analysis examining the ability of RE to predict
healthcare expenditures, a common benchmark of performance internationally
(Breyer et al., 2012), has yet to take place. 
Understanding the strength of the current RE design may also help inform
debate over future health financing reform. While recent plans to expand from a
voluntary to mandatory health insurance system (DOH, 2014a) have been
abandoned on cost grounds (Wren et al., 2015; KPMG, 2015), there was a lack of
evidence on the competitive foundations for such a transition. In this context, robust
RE is considered a crucial precondition for insurer competition in mandatory health
insurance markets (Bevan and van de Ven, 2010; Thomson et al., 2013).
The focus of this paper, therefore, is to use individual-level claims expenditure
data to empirically examine the predictive efficacy of the current Irish RE design
against a number of other alternatives. Of particular interest is the role diagnostic
information may play in improving risk equalisation performance. Basing RE
payments on diagnostic information collected from administrative data is a feature
of more sophisticated RE designs internationally (Breyer et al., 2012). 
Section II provides an overview of voluntary private health insurance (VPHI)
in Ireland, including a background to RE. Section III describes the data and methods
and Section IV presents the results. Section V discusses the implication of these
findings. Section VI concludes.
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II PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN IRELAND
The Irish health system is predominantly tax-financed (71 per cent). Hospital-
based expenditure represents the largest category of financing both publicly and in
terms of private health insurance (CSO, 2015). Eligibility for tax-financed care is
complex (Thomson et al., 2012). However, the defining feature of eligibility is that
all are entitled to publicly-funded acute hospital care, although some individuals
are required to pay a daily charge.1
Despite this entitlement, approximately 43.9 per cent of the population currently
avail of VPHI cover (HIA, 2014a).2 The main benefits of VPHI relate to its
supplementary role, particularly faster access to elective hospital care. VPHI mainly
covers costs for hospital-based care with only partial reimbursement for outpatient
and primary care expenses. VPHI has been described as “playing a key social role”
through easing pressure on the public health system and maintaining access to
health services (Columbo and Tapay, 2004). As such there has traditionally been
strong policy commitment to promoting VPHI. Tax relief is granted on private
health insurance at a standard rate of 20 per cent (deducted at source by the insurers)
while, historically, the State has charged private health insurers below the full
economic cost of care in public hospitals. State subsidisation also takes place more
indirectly through the training of private medical staff by the public system (Nolan,
2006). State promotion of VPHI, however, has proved controversial (Nolan, 2006).
A particular controversial aspect of VPHI provision is that much of the care takes
place in public hospitals. As such, not only do wealthier and healthier privately
insured individuals (Kiil, 2012) receive faster access to elective hospital care, but
in many instances they do so in public hospitals, “crowding out” access to public
patients (Smith and Normand, 2009). 
In recent years, however, there has been a partial unwinding of state support
for VPHI. For instance, since 16 October 2013, the premium amount on which
standard tax-relief is granted has been capped at €1,000 for each adult and €500
for each child and student. In addition, charges for private care in public hospitals
have increased substantially to better reflect the economic cost of care (Turner,
2015).
VPHI has been available in Ireland since 1957, where it was solely provided
by the state-backed Voluntary Health Insurance Board (now trading as Vhi
Healthcare) (VHI). However, due to EU mandate, the market was liberalised in the
mid-1990s and is now populated by four competing insurers,3 of which the VHI
1 This daily charge is currently set at €75 per day for in-patient and day-patient services, capped at a
maximum of €750 in any 12 consecutive months (Citizens Information, 2014).
2 This figure does not capture any effect lifetime community rating, introduced in May 2015, may have had
on insurance take-up.
3 However, on March 9, Irish Life announced agreements to acquire Aviva Health, take full ownership of
Glo Health, and to merge the two companies (HIA, 2015b).
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still has the largest market share (HIA, 2014b). The market is heavily regulated.
Historically, operating under the principles of intergenerational solidarity, the
market has been defined by single-rate community rating regulations, whereby
insurers were required to charge all individuals the same premium per plan (subject
to some exemptions for children and full-time students). However, as of May 2015,
lifetime community rating regulations now apply. Specifically, a loading of 2 per
cent of gross premium now applies for those aged 35 and over for every additional
year they postpone purchase of inpatient private health insurance (up to a maximum
loading of 70 per cent and subject to some exemptions, see HIA, 2015a). The market
is also subject to open enrolment, lifetime cover and minimum benefit regulations. 
2.1 Risk Selection and Market Segmentation
Despite the market being subject to community rating, RE was slow to develop.
Particularly, efforts to commence RE payments in 2006 were successfully
challenged by the first market competitor (BUPA) (Turner and Shinnick, 2013).
This had profound effects on the evolution of the market from a competitive
perspective. Following liberalisation, there was a strong shift in new and existing
consumers, generally the younger and healthier, away from the incumbent VHI and
towards the newer entrants. Lack of RE made it difficult for the VHI to compete on
price, perpetuating this market segmentation and undermining the principle of
community rating (Turner and Shinnick, 2013). Evidence from August 2014 shows
that while VHI insures 54 per cent of the VPHI market overall, 87 per cent of all
policyholders aged 80 years and over, are insured with the VHI (HIA, 2014b). 
While much of this consumer mobility is likely explained by low-risk
consumers naturally experiencing lower switching costs (Duijmelinck et al., 2015),
incentives for risk selection were also strong given the absence of RE. In this
context, the increase in product proliferation as the market evolved has been
considered a sign of insurers looking to segment risk. This includes an increase in
policies with large deductibles and reduced benefits (such as orthopaedic benefits)
which are less attractive to high risks (HIA, 2014c). Moreover, it is likely newer
entrants had greater ability to engage in risk selection activities. For example, newer
entrants have tended not to have branch offices which may dissuade older
individuals from contracting with them (Armstrong, 2010). In addition, newer
entrants have been shown to have likely engaged in “price-shadowing” strategies,
setting prices slightly below similar VHI plans, in an effort to attract more price-
sensitive, low-risk individuals (Competition Authority, 2007). 
2.2 Age-Related Tax Credits and Bona-Fide Risk Equalisation
Given concerns over these issues an interim scheme was introduced in January
2009. The scheme combined two measures designed to support the cost of health
insurance for older people. First, an additional tax relief on health insurance
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premiums was introduced for people aged 50 and over and increasing for higher
age groups. This tax relief was deductible at source, meaning consumers only paid
the net premium after the tax relief was applied to the gross premium set by the
insurers. The value of the tax relief was then paid by the Revenue Commissioner to
the insurers (DOH, 2008). Secondly, in order to fund this additional tax relief, a
new community rating stamp duty was introduced payable by insurers for each
individual insured. The stamp duty payable was lower for children than adults,
reflecting the lower community-rated premium they pay.
This progressed to a RE scheme in January 2013. The new RE design differs
from the interim system in a number of ways. First, RE credits are now payable
from a fund operated by the Health Insurance Authority (HIA) rather than in the
form of tax credits. Second, although the fund is financed similarly to the interim
scheme, based on stamp duties that vary between children and adults, stamp duties
also now vary between levels of cover. Those with non-advanced contracts pay a
lower stamp duty reflecting their lower expected claims costs. The stamp duty is
payable by all open member insurers to the RE fund. Finally, the RE fund reallocates
out the proceeds of the stamp duty to competing insurers in the form of RE credits
(HIA, 2013). These credits are paid to insurers based on age-bands of older
individuals (60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, 85+), which are further
disaggregated by sex and level of policy cover. In addition, a credit is also payable
in respect of each night spent in private or semi-private accommodation by an
insured person (applicable to all insured individuals). From March 2016 onwards,
insurers also receive a payment in respect of each daycase admission. These credits
to insurers are termed “risk adjusters” and are prospectively set. That is, insurers
know the value of these payments in advance of any claims being incurred. The
credits set for each period (usually 12 months) are informed by HIA analysis of
detailed policyholder information, including claims and utilisation data, submitted
by insurers to the regulator in the previous period (HIA, 2013).4 The payment flows
of this system are captured in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Irish Risk Equalisation Payment Flows
Risk equalisation credits
• Age
• Gender
• Level of cover
• Hospital utilisation credit
Stamp duty
Community rated premium
+ stamp duty
Health
Insurance
Authority
Consumers Insurers
4 Based on this analysis, and among certain other considerations, the Minister of Health will then decide on
amendments to the credits specified (see HIA, 2013).
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III DATA AND METHODS
Data for this study were provided by VHI and related to individual-level claims
expenditure data for 1,235,922 insured VHI members, covering the years 2010-
2012.5 Available socio-economic data related to age and sex. Policy level
characteristics consisted of policy type and number of coverage days per year.
Claims data related to the number of daycase and outpatient admissions and the
number and length of inpatient admissions, along with associated costs. Clinical
data were provided in the form of 35 diagnostic cost categories that were compiled
with the aid of clinicians in order to predict high-cost diagnoses for internal VHI
analysis. These cost categories were predicated on primary International
Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes.
Table A1 (Appendix) provides a list of these diagnosis groups. These categories
were defined in-house by the insurer based on clinical judgement. In addition, a
variable flagging whether an individual suffered from a chronic condition was also
included in the database. The chronic illness flag was calculated in-house by the
insurer and based on Iezzoni et al., ICD-9-CM chronic conditions (Iezzoni et al.,
1994).
As is common practice, RE models are evaluated based on their ability to
explain claims expenditure variation (Breyer et al., 2012). The more variation
explained the less incentive to risk-select. Hospital claims expenditure in this study
is predicted using a series of OLS regression models. Although claims expenditure
data tend to display skewed distributions, the standard approach in RE literature is
to apply ordinary least-square (OLS) regression analysis on untransformed claims
expenditure (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000).6
As is standard, these models are analysed both concurrently and prospectively.
This involved dividing the dataset into concurrent and prospective sub-populations.
For the concurrent analyses, all persons with any cover in 2012 were included, i.e.,
a population of 1,235,922 individuals. For the prospective analysis, anybody with
cover in 2011 and cover in 2012 were retained, leaving a prospective population of
1,166,425 individuals (see Table 2). The concurrent analysis used risk adjusters
from 2012 to model claims expenditure in 2012. The prospective model used risk
adjusters in 2011 to model claims expenditure in 2012. In this regard, RE models
are specified as follows:
5 Data collection took place at a time when the interim age-related tax credit scheme was in place.
6 OLS tends to perform robustly for large samples and replicates the cell-based approach for calculating
premium subsidies used in many jurisdictions (including Ireland) (Ellis, 2007; van de Ven and Ellis, 2000).
Furthermore, more complex non-linear models may be less suitable in situations where sample sizes are
large and models are required to estimate a large number of parameters (Ellis, 2007). 
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Yit = a + Xit b + uit (Concurrent) (1)
where t = 2012 and i = 1,235,922
Yit = a + Xit–1 b + uit (Prospective) (2)
where t = 2012 and i = 1,166,425
The outcome variable of interest in this analysis, Y, is individual-level yearly claims
expenditure payable by the insurer. This relates to inpatient, daycase and outpatient
claims expenditure. Independent variables in the model are denoted by X, b are
associated parameters, and a is a constant. Errors between observed and predicted
values are captured by the disturbance term u. The model is estimated by OLS.
3.1 Models Estimated
In all, five RE models are estimated, both concurrently and prospectively. The
risk adjusters (i.e. independent variables) included in these models are outlined
below and models are summarised in Table 1. Model 3 contains the same set of
adjusters on which insurers are currently reimbursed. The prospective version of
this model best captures the design of the current risk equalisation scheme. 
3.1.1 Age, Sex and Level of Cover
The most basic risk adjusters used to risk-equalise premiums are based on age
and sex. They are easy to collect and monitor, however they are poor predictors of
claim expenditure (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000; Ellis, 2007). As noted, RE credits
in Ireland are provided to insurers based on the age of enrollees, varying in five-
year age bands from age 60 up to 84 and for those 85 and older. These credits also
vary based on sex and across two levels of cover – advanced and non-advanced.
Non-advanced refers to basic cover policies where “not more than 66 per cent of
the full cost of hospital charges in a private hospital or prescribed minimum
benefits, if lower, is always provided” (HIA, 2013). Advanced cover refers to all
other policies. Level of cover is a unique risk adjuster in an international context.
However, its inclusion in the Irish RE model is justified based on the unique
public/private mix of hospital care in the Irish system. That is, differences in
expenditures between individuals, rather than being a reflection of health status,
could represent differences in accommodation (for example, whether a patient was
treated in a semi-private ward in a public hospital or private room in a private
hospital). As a consequence, insurance products that offer low levels of cover (non-
advanced) receive lower RE credits than more comprehensive (advanced) products.
Model 1 includes age, sex and level of cover as risk adjusters.
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3.1.2 Inpatient Hospital Nights
Models incorporating data on utilisation (or prior expenditures) tend to show
significant predictive improvements over models based solely on demographic
information (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). However, the main argument against using
utilisation data in RE models is that it creates inappropriate incentives on the part
of health insurers as payment of risk-adjusted subsidies is tied directly to quantity
of healthcare utilisation. Insurers therefore may not be motivated to pursue cost
control. In the absence of information on other measures of health status, the HIA
has included a payment for each overnight hospital stay recorded by an insured
individual as part of the current RE design. In this context, Model 2 includes age,
sex, level of cover and an adjuster for frequency of inpatient hospital stays. The
prospective version of this model best reflects the design of the original RE scheme
introduced in 2013. 
3.1.3 Daycase Admissions 
Model 3 supplements Model 2 by including a flag for daycase admissions. As
noted, since March 2016 insurers are also reimbursed for each private daycase
admission. The prospective version of this model therefore best captures the current
RE design.
3.1.4 Diagnostic Information
Using diagnostic information as a measure of health status may help reduce the
inefficiency problems associated with reimbursement based on utilisation
Table 1: Risk Equalisation Models to be Estimated
Model  Description  
This model consists of 24 (6*2*2) age, sex, non-
Model 1 Demographic Model advanced/advanced cover dummy categories. Where 
applicable this will be referred to as the demographic model.  
Model 2 Demographic Model Model 1 plus a variable capturing the count of inpatient 
incl. inpatient nights  hospital days per insuree for that year.   
Model 3 Model 2 incl. daycase Model 2 plus a count of daycase admissions. This model is
admissions (current RE adjusters) includes the same set of adjusters as the current RE model.  
Model 4 Model 2 incl. chronic
Model 2 plus a binary flag representing whether or not a
policyholder received a principal ICD-9-CM diagnosis of a 
illness flag
chronic condition within the last two years of interest.  
Model 5 Demographic Model Model 1 plus 35 count variables representing each aggregated
incl. diagnostic groups ICD-9-CM diagnostic cost category.  
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information (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). However, inefficiency incentives may not
be completely removed as diagnoses are generally tied to some form of
hospitalisation. Measures of diagnostic severity may improve the predictive efficacy
of RE models as they may better capture variation in cost above that of generic
measures of utilisation. However, basing payments on severity of illness may
introduce incentives for insurers (where possible) to influence treatment and
diagnoses, and “upcode” patient severity (Ellis, 2007). That said, diagnoses from
insurance claims have become the most widely used set of information beyond
demographic variables (Ellis, 2007). Most health insurance systems with advanced
RE schemes tend to use measures of diagnoses as risk adjusters.
A primary objective of this study, therefore, is to assess whether the current RE
specification can be improved through the use of diagnosis-based information. This
is assessed through the application of two alternative sets of diagnostic information.
In addition to the risk adjusters specified in Model 2, Model 4 includes a binary
flag representing whether or not a policyholder received an ICD-9-CM diagnosis
of a chronic condition within the last two years of interest. Diagnosis of a chronic
illness has previously been considered for inclusion in the Irish RE scheme (HIA,
2013).
Including more detailed diagnostic coding was also considered by the HIA,
however there was a lack of support.7 Disadvantages related to practical difficulties
including “the large volume of data generated, the lack of a credible volume of data
in each cell… and issues with consistency of data and whether it would promote a
bias towards in-patient treatment” (HIA, 2010b). However, recently there has been
renewed interest in the applicability of diagnosis-based RE in the Irish market
(DOH, 2014b). In this context, Model 5 includes information on 35 high cost
diagnostic groups based on ICD-9-CM classification (see Table A1).
3.2 Partial Year Weighting and Validation Approach
In order to avoid under-prediction, partial year enrolees’ hospital claims
expenditures are adjusted through the following procedure. First, partial-year
expenditures are annualised by dividing by the fraction of the year each enrolee
was covered. Secondly, in the calculation of unconditional and conditional means,
each observation is weighted by the same fraction. As is standard, concurrent (where
risk adjusters predict claims expenditure in the same period) and prospective models
(where risk adjusters predict claims expenditure in the following period) are
reported. To avoid inflated predictive accuracy as a result of over-fitting, a ten-fold
cross-validation approach is employed. This process involves randomly splitting
the data into k approximately equal parts. For the kth part, models are estimated
using the remaining k-1 parts and validated on the kth part. This process is repeated
7 This related to proposed diagnostic payments based on diagnosis-related groups.
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for all values of k. This analysis sets k=10. Previous analyses suggest this number
of iterations to be sufficient (Behrend et al., 2007; Mookim and Ellis, 2008). Model
evaluation metrics of interest (see below) returned from this process are then
averaged and reported. 
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
Predictive performance of all models will be assessed both from an individual
and group-level perspective. It is important to realise, in this regard, that due to the
large amount of random variation in healthcare expenditure and the fact that some
predictors of expenditure may not be suitable for RE, that RE models (particularly
prospectively) often have poor prediction levels (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000).
Individual prediction will be measured in terms of the adjusted r-squared statistic
(R2), by Cummings prediction measure (CPM) and by mean absolute prediction
error (MAPE). 
R2 is the standard metric for evaluating RE models. However, one concern
levelled at the R2 metric is that, as it squares prediction errors, it can be overly
sensitive to large prediction errors (Cumming et al., 2002). MAPE and CPM on
the other hand, consider absolute errors, and therefore weight large and small errors
the same. MAPE is defined as the mean of the absolute difference between observed
and predicted values. CPM provides a standardisation of this absolute deviation,
providing a ratio of mean absolute prediction errors to absolute deviations of
observations from the unconditional average. CPM thus can be reported as a
proportion ranging from 0 to 1 and, in terms of model fit, is interpreted the same
as R2. MAPE and CPM will always display the same relative ranking of models in
terms of performance. Higher R2, CPM and lower MAPE values signify better
model fit, respectively. 
Group prediction will be assessed through predictive ratios (PR) for both
quintile of expenditure and morbidity status. Morbidity status is proxied by the
number of diagnoses assigned to an individual within a given year. The closer the
predictive ratio is to 1 (i.e. where observed equals predicted expenditure), the better
the model performs for that group.
In order to reduce the influence of outliers on model performance and to
simulate the impact of introducing outlier-risk sharing, observed claims
expenditures are truncated at €25,000. Although this threshold is arbitrarily chosen,
it corresponds approximately with similar thresholds in other jurisdictions (e.g.
Netherlands, €20,000 (Breyer et al., 2012); Germany, €20,450 (Breyer et al.,
2012); and Australia, AUS$50,000 (Connelly et al., 2010)).
3.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
Sensitivity analyses conducted as part of this study are presented in the
Appendix. Firstly, given distributional concerns raised when modelling health
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expenditures it was prudent to test RE models using alternative functional forms.
In this context, a two-part model (probit; OLS) and a GLM (link-log; family-
Gaussian) were also estimated and results are presented in Table A2.
In addition, to simulate the impact of alternative outlier pools, Table A3 reports
evaluation metrics for expenditure truncated at €10,000 and €50,000, respectively.
IV RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Over half of the concurrently
(prospectively) insured were female. A total of 77 per cent (77.6 per cent) of
insurees were aged less than 60, while 96.1 per cent (96.4 per cent) had advanced-
level cover. In addition, 75.9 per cent (75.5 per cent) of the concurrently
(prospectively) insured made no claim. Average claims expenditure for the
concurrently (prospectively) insured was €819.65 (€834.40). The most common
classifiable diagnosis was “Malignant Cancer, Leukaemia” accounting for 11.2 per
cent (9.9 per cent) of concurrent (prospective) diagnoses. 
4.2 Individual Prediction Metrics
Individual prediction metrics are presented in Table 3. In terms of the concurrent
analysis, the demographic model performed worse (R2 = 3.0 per cent). Model 2,
with the addition of inpatient hospital nights, performed significantly better (R2 =
45.2 per cent), while including daycase admissions (Model 3) further increased
predictive ability (R2 = 50.9 per cent). Substituting a chronic illness indicator for
the daycase admissions flag (Model 4) lowered the R2 slightly (R2 = 47.4 per cent).
Model 5 (based on ICD-9-CM groupings) explained 36.8 per cent of expenditure
variation.
The demographic model had the highest (lowest) MAPE (CPM) of €1,275.42
(5.3 per cent). Model 2 performed noticeably better with a MAPE (CPM) of
€871.20 (35.4 per cent). As with the R2 metric, based on MAPE and CPM Model
3 (MAPE = €722.96; CPM = 46.4 per cent) was the best performing model.
In terms of the prospective analysis, the demographic model again predicted
the least variation in claims expenditure (R2 = 3.0 per cent). Models 2, 3, 4, and 5
all represented successive marginal improvements in R2 (5.8 per cent, 6.8 per cent,
7.0 per cent and 16.6 per cent, respectively). MAPE and CPM provided the same
model rankings as given by R2.
Sensitivity analyses of functional form (Table A2) showed that both the two-
part model and the GLM provided similar interpretations to the OLS results
presented above. In terms of prediction, the two-part model performed similarly
well to the straightforward OLS model, while the GLM specification performed
slightly worse.
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4.3 Predictive Ratios
Predictive ratios are displayed in Figure 2. For all concurrent models, predictive
ratios fell as we moved from the lowest quintile (Q1) of expenditure to the highest
(Q5). All models over-predicted expenditure for Q1 and Q2 and under-predicted
expenditure for Q5. As expected, Model 1 performed worst in terms of group-level
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Concurrent and Prospectively Insured
Concurrently Prospectively
Insured % Insured %
(N=1,235,922)    (N= 1,166,425)
Gender Male 47.9 47.8  
Female 52.1 52.2  
Age 0-59 77 77.6
60-64 6.3 6.4  
65-69 5.7 5.5
70-74 4.3 4.2
75-79 3.3 3.1
80-84 2.1 1.9
85+ 1.4 1.2  
Level of cover Advanced 96.1 96.4  
Non-Advanced 3.9 3.6  
Number of admissions 0 75.9 75.2  
1 14.6 15  
2 5.1 5.3  
3 + 4.4 4.6  
Positive claims No 75.9 75.5
expenditure 2012 Yes 24.1 24.5
Average Claims  €819.65 €834.40
Expenditure (S.D) 2012 (€4,326.81) (€4,357.09)
Diagnoses Diagnoses
concurrently prospectively
insured % insured %
(N= 555,205)  (N=549,695)
5 most frequently All other diagnoses 81.6 82.6
recorded principal  Malignant Cancer, Leukaemia 11.2 9.9
ICD-9-CM Categories Maternity 1.8 2.1  
Coronary Artery Disease 1.6 1.6  
Musculoskeletal / 
Connective Tissue Disorder 0.7 0.7  
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prediction for Q5 (PR = 0.12) while Model 3 performed best (PR = 0.59). Relative
to the other models, Model 5 noticeably over-predicts expenditure for those in Q1
and Q2 (Figure 2). In terms of morbidity status (i.e. number of diagnoses), in
general the group predictive ability of models falls as morbidity status worsens.
The demographic model performs worst, with lower predictive ratios across all
categories, relative to the other models. As morbidity status worsens, Model 5
becomes increasingly the best predictor of expenditure. For those with five or more
diagnoses, Model 5 has a PR of 0.94.
Similar to the concurrent analysis, all prospective models over-predicted
expenditure for Q1 and Q2 (particularly Model 5) and under-predicted expenditure
for Q5. Under-prediction for Q5 was worse for all models (except Model 1 with
the same PR) compared with the concurrent analysis. For Q5, Model 1 under-
predicted spending more than all other models (PR = 0.12), while Model 5 under-
predicted spending the least (PR = 0.32). As morbidity status worsens, all models
increasingly under-predicted expenditure. Within all categories of morbidity, Model
5 was by far the best predictor of observed expenditure (PR = 0.52).
Figure 2: Predictive Ratios Broken Down by Actual (Non-Truncated) Claims
Expenditure Quintiles (Q1-Q5) and Number of Diagnoses (1-5+) for
Concurrent and Prospective Models
74 The Economic and Social Review
4.4 Expenditure Truncation
Overall, truncation had the effect of improving model fit in the prospective
analysis. Results were more ambiguous for the concurrent analysis with only Model
1 and Model 5 reporting higher R2 and CPM with truncated expenditure. 
All truncated concurrent models, apart from Model 3 reported lower MAPE (see
Table 3). 
Similar trends were observed truncating expenditure at €10,000 and €50,000
(Table A3). For the prospective analysis, truncating at €10,000 provided an
unambiguously better fit than truncating at €25,000, which in turn provided better
fit than truncating at €50,000.
Table 3: Individual Prediction Metrics for Concurrent and Prospective
Models (Raw and Truncated Expenditure)
Adj. MAPE CPM
R2 *100 € *100  
Concurrent Model – Raw Expenditure  
Demographic model (Model 1) 3.0 1,275.42 5.3  
Model 1 incl. inpatient nights (Model 2) 45.2 871.2 35.4  
Model 2 incl. daycase admissions (Model 3) 50.9 722.96 46.4  
Model 2 incl. a chronic illness flag (Model 4) 47.4 828.28 38.6  
Demographic model incl. 35 ICD-9-CM diagnosis groupings (Model 5) 36.8 744.05 44.6  
Prospective – Raw Expenditure 
Demographic model (Model 1) 3.0 1,280.17 5.2  
Model 1 incl. inpatient nights (Model 2) 5.8 1,250.21 7.3  
Model 2 incl. daycase admissions (Model 3, current RE design) 6.8 1,231.91 8.5  
Model 2 incl. a chronic illness flag (Model 4) 7.0 1,229.15 8.7  
Demographic model incl. 35 ICD-9-CM diagnosis groupings (Model 5) 16.6 989.69 25.7
Concurrent – Truncated Expenditure (€25,000) 
Demographic model (Model 1) 5.1 1,080.57 5.7  
Model 1 incl. inpatient nights (Model 2) 38.2 842.26 26.5  
Model 2 incl. daycase admissions (Model 3) 44.3 745.9 34.8  
Model 2 incl. a chronic illness flag (Model 4) 42.7 793.99 30.6  
Demographic model incl. 35 ICD-9-CM diagnosis groupings (Model 5) 44.6 607.28 46.7
Prospective – Truncated Expenditure (€25,000) 
Demographic model (Model 1) 5.0 1,086.97 5.5  
Model 1 incl. inpatient nights (Model 2) 7.5 1,066.98 7.2  
Model 2 incl. daycase admissions (Model 3) 8.51 1,054.25 8.2  
Model 2 incl. a chronic illness flag (Model 4) 9.27 1,048.17 8.7  
Demographic model incl. 35 ICD-9-CM diagnosis groupings (Model 5) 23.41 814.08 28.1
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V DISCUSSION
This paper focused on empirically evaluating the recent introduction of RE
payments in the Irish private health insurance market. The Irish market is
underpinned by the idea of intergenerational solidarity, manifested through heavy
regulation, particularly community rating. However, the evolution of the market in
the absence of risk-adjusted subsidies created strong incentives for risk selection
and contributed to market segmentation. In the absence of subsidies, the incumbent
VHI found it increasingly difficult to compete on price, undermining explicit policy
objectives to provide affordable cover for high-risks. In this context, the results of
this study raise a number of important, and timely, considerations.
First, concurrent models outperform prospective models. Particularly,
utilisation-based models (i.e. Model 2 and 3) appear to perform comparatively well
in a concurrent context and this could be related to the fact insurers pay set per
diem rates for private care in public hospitals (Citizens Information 2014). Figures
suggest that for those with private health insurance, just over 60 per cent of their
inpatient stays take place in public hospitals (CSO, 2011). 
The fact that concurrent models perform better is not a surprising result (van
de Ven and Ellis, 2000; Behrend et al., 2007; Chang and Weiner, 2010), however,
this form of reimbursement may not be preferable in practice. Particularly,
reimbursing insurers ex-post on actual expenditures recorded suggests better ability
to reduce risk selection incentives as predicted costs better reflect actual costs, thus
reducing insurer financial liability to a greater extent. However, this also reduces
insurer incentives to behave efficiently. Moreover, retrospective payments can create
uncertainties around payment allocations leading to difficulties for insurers in
calculating premiums. This is a particular problem in voluntary markets where
consumers use premium signals not only as a basis for insurer choice, but also in
deciding whether to take out insurance at all (Armstrong et al., 2010). Prospective
payments may be less accurate; however, they better preserve incentives for efficient
behaviour and allow insurers to ex-ante factor in the impact of credits in determining
plan premiums. 
Second, given RE credits in the Irish VPHI are prospectively set, a worrying
finding is that the former (5.8 per cent) and current (6.8 per cent) RE designs are
poor predictors of claims expenditure. As discussed earlier, RE need not be perfect,
however, it should be the case that RE adequately reimburses insurers for the risk
they hold to the point that the cost of investing in risk selection (e.g. marketing,
product design, reputational damage) outweighs any benefits (in terms of predicable
profits) (van de Ven, 2011). This study would therefore suggest that the current RE
specification is unlikely to be effective at combating risk selection incentives and/or
correcting for market segmentation. This is reflected in concerns raised by the HIA
in 2015 that “in the last year insurers have continued to adopt strategies to segment
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and select business with lower claims costs”, despite the introduction of RE (HIA,
2015c). In this context, more sophisticated RE designs in Germany and Netherlands
have been shown to prospectively predict upwards of 20 per cent of claims
expenditure (van Veen et al., 2015; Buchner et al., 2013). The CMS-HCC model
used by Medicare to risk-adjust capitation payments to private plans has been shown
to predict approximately 12.5 per cent of claims expenditure (Pope et al., 2011).
Caution does need to be exercised, however, when comparing performance of RE
models across systems given differences in insured populations and level of benefits
covered. 
Underlying these models, however, is that subsidies include payments
predicated on diagnostic information. For instance, in addition to socio-economic
adjusters, the 2012 Dutch RE scheme included 13 inpatient Diagnostic Cost Groups
(DCGs) and 25 Pharmacy Cost Groups (PCGs) plus an adjuster for multiple-year
high costs. Similarly, the German RE system and the CMS-HCC model use
diagnostic information in the form of Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC) as
their basis for reimbursement. And in the context of this study, evidence would
suggest that the current Irish RE design could be substantially improved through
the substitution of the current utilisation-based health status adjusters for diagnosis-
based high cost categories, both overall (Model 5; R2= 16.6 per cent), and for high-
risk individuals (Figure 2).8 Another benefit of introducing a diagnostic adjuster
would be that, to the extent that insurers can influence utilisation of acute services,
incentives for efficient behaviour would be improved as reimbursement would not
be tied directly to frequency of utilisation (e.g. number of nights spent in acute
care). 
An alternative, or complementary, proposal could be the introduction of an
outlier-risk pool, common to many RE designs (Breyer et al., 2012), whereby high-
cost individuals are reimbursed ex-post above a certain threshold. However, again
policymakers would need to weigh up the risk selection/efficiency trade-off of such
a move. 
Third, although the introduction of diagnosis-based payments in the Irish market
may be beneficial, it may not be straightforward. In this regard, diagnosis-based
payments were previously considered in the design of the current RE scheme9 but
were eventually rejected in favour of a hospital utilisation adjuster (HIA, 2010a).
This was justified on grounds of both lack of support for diagnosis-based payments
and practical difficulties with its implementation (HIA, 2010b). Recently, the
implementation of diagnosis-based RE in the Irish system has been mooted again
(DOH, 2014b), however, it is unclear if it is any more realisable.
8 One caveat however, is that this model did also significantly over-predict for those in the lower quintiles
of expenditure, relative to other models, which itself might distort incentives. 
9 Mention was given to both specific medical diagnoses and diagnosis-related groups (DRGs).
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For instance, any form of diagnosis-based payments introduced in the Irish
system would have to be acceptable to all stakeholders. In this context, RE in the
Irish system, as noted, has historically been a contentious issue with concerns over
its legitimacy subject to a successful legal challenge by the first market competitor.
However more recently, during the consultation phase, newer entrants expressed
serious concerns over the need for a health status adjuster in the current RE
specification (Aviva, 2010; Quinn Healthcare, 2010). And given the asymmetry of
risk in the market, VHI is a net beneficiary of payment flows while the newer
entrants are net contributors (HIA, 2014c). As such, there may be significant
opposition from the newer entrants to the introduction of diagnosis-based payments
if such refinements reinforce the transfer of resources to the VHI.
Feasibility is another issue to consider (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). For
instance, the introduction of diagnosis-based RE would likely place a much greater
administrative burden on both insurers and the regulator. It is unclear at present the
extent to which all insurers have the ability to accurately capture and code relevant
diagnostic information. Moreover diagnosis-based payments would increase the
informational requirements of both insurers and regulators in terms of submitting
and auditing, respectively, RE returns. Finally, linking payments to diagnoses may
create issues in terms of insurer incentives for accurate reporting. Processes would
need to be put in place to monitor and manage such activity.
Fourth, a separate issue is the impact that recently introduced lifetime
community rating may have on the market. For instance, as a form of risk-rating,
lifetime community rating may complement RE subsidies in reducing selection
incentives. However, if lifetime community rating encourages younger cohorts to
take out insurance (as it is designed to) and if, for instance, newer entrants are better
able to capture these risks this could contribute to further market segmentation.
Low-risk consumers, in this context, might be attracted to low-cost policies (as a
cheap way of avoiding loadings), something the newer insurers, given their already
better risk profiles (due to lack of robust RE) may be better able to provide.
Finally, results from this analysis add to current evidence that cautions against
expanding the role competitive health insurance plays in the Irish market. While
previous analyses have suggested universal health insurance to be undesirable from
a cost perspective, this study suggests that competitive foundations for such a
model, in the form of a robust RE, are currently not in place. Aside from the
importance of RE in a voluntary market, it is considered a crucial precondition for
effective managed competition (Bevan and van de Ven, 2010).
5.1 Limitations
Regrettably, due to data limitations, more established diagnosis-groupers such
as CMS-HCC or DCG/HCC models (Duncan, 2011) could not be tested. However,
results would suggest that future research into the application of other forms of
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diagnosis-based payments in the Irish system would be worthwhile. Another
limitation of this study is that analysis is predicated on data from one (albeit the
largest) insurer in the market with a worse than average risk profile. This may have
some implications for generalisability of findings. 
VI CONCLUSIONS
This study empirically analysed the efficacy of the recently introduced RE
scheme in the Irish VPHI market and whether improvements could be made to its
specification. Importantly, this study suggests that in a prospective context, the
current RE design performs poorly and may not be addressing risk selection
incentives, nor correcting for acute risk segmentation, that have historically
characterised the market. In this context, evidence suggests that the RE design could
be substantially improved through the substitution of the current hospital utilisation
risk adjusters with one based on high-cost diagnosis groups. However, policymakers
should be cognisant of issues around feasibility and acceptability related to the
introduction of diagnosis-based payments in the Irish market. This study is
particularly timely given recent health system proposals discussing transition from
a voluntary to mandatory health insurance system.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: ICD-9-CM Diagnostic Categories
CD-9-CM Diagnostic Category
1 Alcoholism 19 Haemophilia  
2 Chronic Kidney Disease 20 Hyperlipidemia  
3 Chronic Pulmonary Disease 21 Hypertension  
4 CNS (MS) 22 Infectious Disease (Hep A-E, HIV)  
5 CNS Disorder (Cerebral Palsy) 23 Infectious Liver Disease  
6 CNS Disorder (Parkinson) 24 Malignant Cancer, Leukaemia  
7 CNS Disorders 25 Maternity  
8 Congestive Heart Failure 26 Mental disorder  
9 Coronary Artery Disease 27 Mental disorder (Schizophrenia)  
10 CVA Stroke 28 Metabolism Disorders (Cystic Fibrosis)  
11 Dementia 29 Musculoskeletal/ connective tissue disorder  
12 Depression 30 Polycystic Ovary Syndrome   
13 Diabetes 31 Peripheral Vascular Disease  
14 Disorder of the adrenal glands 32 Renal Failure  
15 Drug Abuse 33 Severe Chronic Liver Disease  
16 Epilepsy 34 Systemic Lupus Erythematosus  
17 Gastrointestinal Disease (Crohns) 35 All other diagnoses  
18 Gastrointestinal Disease (Ulcerative Colitis)
Note: Full list of individual principal ICD-9-CM codes used for categorisations available on request.
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Table A2: TPM and GLM specifications
Concurrent  
TPM (First-part: Probit, GLM (Link:Log, 
Second-part: Linear) Distribution:Gaussian)
Adj. CPM Adj. CPM
Pseudo MAPE *100 Pseudo MAPE *100
R2*100 R2*100
Model 1 3.0 1286.17 5.3 Model 1 3.0 1286.17 5.3  
Model 2 49.4 767 43.5 Model 2 31.5 1056.8 22.2  
Model 3 52.9 587.26 56.8 Model 3 23.9 907.08 33.5  
Model 4 50.1 747.21 45.1 Model 4 31.1 1015.56 25.3  
Model 5 37.6 695.96 48.8 Model 5 20.2 865.23 40.0  
Prospective
TPM (First-part: Probit, GLM (Link:Log, Distribution:
Second-part: Linear) Gaussian)
Adj. CPM Adj. CPM
Pseudo MAPE *100 Pseudo MAPE *100
R2*100 R2*100
Model 1 3.0 1290.64 5.2 Model 1 2.9 1290.64 5.2  
Model 2 5.0 1262.56 7.2 Model 2 4.3 1291.91 5.1  
Model 3 5.9 1242.48 8.6 Model 3 5.0 1284.05 5.7  
Model 4 6.4 1242.73 8.6 Model 4 5.6 1276.71 6.2  
Model 5 17.4 954.3 29.5 Model 5 10.2 1176.17 26.2  
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Table A3: Individual Prediction Metrics for Concurrent and Prospective
Models, Truncated at €10,000 and €50,000, Respectively
Adj. R2 MAPE CPM
*100 €  *100
Concurrent –Truncated €10,000  
Model 1 6.1 842.79 5.9  
Model 2 28.5 720.06 19.6  
Model 3 34.3 662.23 26.1  
Model 4 34.3 676.33 24.5  
Model 5 49.5 449.97 49.8  
Prospective – Truncated €10, 000  
Model 1 6 856.84 5.7  
Model 2 7.9 845.03 7
Model 3 8.8 837.21 7.9  
Model 4 9.9 830.14 8.7  
Model 5 28 644.19 29.1  
Concurrent – Truncated €50,000  
Model 1 4 1,217.08 5.5  
Model 2 43.5 883.44 31.4  
Model 3 49.8 757.34 41.2  
Model 4 46.8 836.88 35
Model 5 43.5 703.27 45.4  
Prospective – Truncated €50,000  
Model 1 3.9 1,243.03 5.3  
Model 2 6.8 1,217.92 7.2  
Model 3 7.9 1,202.56 8.4  
Model 4 8.4 1,198.69 8.7  
Model 5 20.4 964.24 26.5
